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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-COURTS-APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF Swift
v. Tyson TO THE UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw-Plaintiff, a resi-
dent of Pennsylvania, sued defendant, a resident of Florida, on promissory
notes executed, delivered, and payable in Florida, in a federal district court.
The notes were held non-negotiable under the Negotiable Instruments Law of
Florida.1 An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Held, that the notes were negotiable,2 the district court having erred in using
the general principles of the law merchant as a basis for interpreting the Florida
law rather than the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida. Burns
Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 54 Sup. Ct. 813 (1934).
Under our dual system of courts which frequently allows a federal court
to exercise jurisdiction in local matters normally adjudicated in the state tri-
bunals, a vexatious condition has arisen because federal courts often refuse
to be bound by the decisions of the state in which the cause originated-and this
while professing to apply the law of that state.' This has created the highly
anomalous situation of conflicting decisions on identical points.4  Accordingly,
the result in a given case may depend merely upon the adventitious circum-
stances of diversity of citizenship or the amount of claim. The Federal judiciary
Act, designed to obviate this difficulty, made the "laws" of the states binding on
the federal courts in deciding local matters.5 The Supreme Court, however,
in Swift v. Tyson,6 early whittled this ambiguous term by interpreting it to
exclude decisions based on the non-statutory commercial law, although it was
said to include statutes and the decisions construing them. In later years the
scope of this decision has been broadened by excluding likewise decisions in fields
of law other than the commercial law,7 thereby swelling the morass of conflicting
decisions. In more recent times some courts have further extended the doctrine
so as to exclude even statutes from the scope of the term "laws", where these
statutes were merely codifications of previously existing law,8 the analogy being
drawn to cases involving the general common law. In the principal case, how-
ever, the Supreme Court, by its refusal to recognize any distinction in this
i. The decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in Burns Mortgage Co.
v. Fried, 67 F. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
2. The bills and notes point involved was whether a provision for installment pay-
ments of interest before maturity and one for added interest on deferred interest payments
prevented negotiability. Although the point is not covered specifically by the Negotiable In-
struments Law, most courts favor negotiability. See I DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
(7th ed. 1933) 66, 67.
3. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R. v. Solan, I69 U. S. 133 (1898); Washburn
& Moen Mfg. Co. v. Reliance Marine Ins. Co., io6 Fed. 116 (C. C. D. Mass. 1895).
4. For a comprehensive collection of such cases, see Note (912) 4o L. R. A. (N. s.)380.
5. I STAT. 92 (789), 28 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1927). "The laws of the several states
. . . shall be regarded as rules of decision . . . in the courts of the United States." It
has been shown that this was the purpose of the Act. See Warren, New Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 83.
6. I6 Pet. i (U. S. 1842).
7. Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495 (U. S. 1842) (insur-
ance contract) ; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 (1892) (torts) ; John-
son v. Charles D. Norton Co., 159 Fed. 361 (C. C. A. 6th, igo8) (contract of guarantee).
8. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lane, I5I Fed. 276 (C. C. E. D. Ga. 19o7), cert. denied,
2o8 U. S. 617 (9o8) (insurance statute) ; Capital City State Bank v. Swift, 29 Fed. 5oS
(D. C. Okla. J923) (Negotiable Instruments Law of Okla.); American Mfg. Co. v. United
States Shipping Bd. Emerg. Fleet Corp., 7 F. (2d) 565 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) (Uniform
Sales Act of N. Y.).
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respect among the various types of statutes, has definitely set itself against any
expansion of the doctrine which will trench upon the field of statutory law. The
result seems eminently proper. Besides the fact that statutory law was expressly
exempted from the doctrine announced in Swift v. Tyson, there is no sound
reason for its extension in the face of the well merited criticism which it has
drawn,"0 and which has been directed primarily at the resultant lack of uniform-
ity in the law.11
CONFLICT OF LAWS-SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS-ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHT OF
ACTION UNDER FOREIGN STATUTE AGAINST EXECUTOR OF TORTFEAsoR-Plain-
tiff sustained injuries in an automobile accident in Virginia through the negli-
gence of defendant's testator, both being residents of New York. Plaintiff
brought suit in New York under a Virginia statute providing for survival of
such actions against tortfeasors' estates.' New York does not permit such
actions.2 Held, that since the law of the forum determines the devolution of
decedents' estates, the court was here without jurisdiction to grant judgments
binding on domiciliary executors. Herzog v. Stern, 264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23
0934).
Whether a cause of action for damages survives the death of the wrong-
doer is determined by the law of the place of wrong.3 Conceding this, the
instant court refused to enforce such claim against the tortfeasor's estate, restrict-
ing application of the rule to cases in which the law of the forum permits such
survival action.4  This restriction seems to be unwarranted in theory.
By adopting a rule similar to that of the foreign rule the court
is not, out of comity, giving extraterritorial effect to the foreign law,
but is rather enforcing its own conflict of laws rule.5 It would be merely
an application of its own common law rule of conflict of laws that a statu-
tory or common law right acquired in the place of wrong will be enforced
in the forum unless it is repugnant to the latter's public policy, even though
the lex fori grants no such right.6 The court would be imposing this liability
9. Principal case at 815.
Io. See Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v. Tyson (1930) 16 VA. L. REv. 225;
Fordham, The Federal 'Courts and the Construction of Uniforin State Laws (1928) 7 N. C.
L. REV. 423.
ii. A striking example of the effect of this lack of uniformity is seen in Black &
White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U., S. 518 (1927). A contract
for an exclusive taxicab stand was declared illegal by the state court. One of the parties
then incorporated itself in an adjoining state, thereby obtaining federal jurisdiction. The
federal court then held the contract legal, in effect reversing the state court on a purely
local question.
I. VA. CODE (1930) § 5790.
2. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 120 (igo).
3. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent. Draft, 1932) § 426; cf. Orr v. Ahern, 107
Conn. 174, 139 Atl. 691 (1928) ; Friedman v. Greenberg, no N. J L. 462, 166 Atl. I9 (1933).
In both cases recovery was denied because the place of wrong had no survival statute although
one did exist in the forum.
4. Accord: RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent. Draft, 1932) § 426, Comment (b).
Only one case is cited and no arguments are suggested.
5. "The conflict of laws is a part of the common law, and the conflict of laws rules of
each state are part of its law. They determine when and to what extent the foreign law ele-
ment enters into cases brought before them. . . ." GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 8;
Dicey, Private International Law as a Branch of the Law of England (i8go) 6 L. Q. REv. I.
6. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99, 12o N. E. 198 (1918) ; RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Proposed Final Draft No. 4, 1934) § 49; GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1927) 389; cf. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924)
33 YALE L. J. 457.
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on the estate not by force of any foreign law but rather because it has determined
that its conflict of laws rule requires that such liability be imposed. There seems
to be no necessity that there be also a local statute imposing such liability in
order that the state's sovereignty be preserved. It must be conceded, however,
that the court has the power to refuse to enforce such a claim because it may
deem it undesirable to do so. Whether exercise of this power was here justified
practically is likewise doubtful. It seems desirable that a right once acquired in
one state should be uniformly enforced 7 and only exceptional circumstances
should lead one state to refuse to enforce such right." The circumstances of
the instant case do not warrant such refusal. A judgment against the estate
would not be inequitable to anyone concerned. Had the tortfeasor been alive,
the plaintiff would have recovered. The fortuitous circumstance of the death
of the tortfeasor, under the decision in the instant case, is then a windfall to
legatees and distributees and deprives the plaintiff of just compensation.9 More-
over, the meager authority extant is opposed to the result here reached, the courts
apparently being unpersuaded that there was sufficient ground to deviate from
their established rules of conflict of laws.3
0
CONTRACTs-ARBITRATION AND AWARD--VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION SET-
TLING DISpIUTES OVER ILLEGAL TRANSAcTIONs-Plaintiff and defendant, mem-
bers of the same Grain and Cotton Exchange, entered into a written agree-
ment,1 whereby a controversy which had arisen between them over some marginal
speculations in wheat should be submitted to an arbitration board for decision.
The disputed transactions were clearly illegal,2 being prohibited by a gaming
statute.3 Plaintiff sued on an award in his favor. Held, that the "incidental"
connection of the obligations arising under the arbitration award with the illegal
transaction did not invalidate plaintiff's case. Smith z. Gladney, 70 S. W. (2d)
342 (Tex. 1934).
With almost equal firmness two legal principles have become established
in their respective paths: (I) a contract incidentally connected with or growing
out of an illegal transaction is not thereby necessarily unenforceable; and (2)
disputes concerning an illegal matter or transaction are not proper subjects for
arbitration, the award in such case standing upon no higher ground than the
original claim and being consequently unenforceable.5 Rarely have they con-
7. Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (1917) 27 YALE L. J. 656.
8. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99, 113, 12o N. E. 198, 202 (1918).
9. Evans, Survival of Claims For and Against Executors and Administrators (1930) 19
Ky. L. J. 195.
io. Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (ig3i), rev'd on other
grounds, 182 Minn. 231, 234 N. W. 868 (1931) ; for favorable comment, see (1931) 29 MICE.
L. REV. 929; cf. (1931) I5 MINN. L. REV. 705; Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N.
W. 329 (1932).
I. The consideration stated in the "Contract and Agreement for Arbitration" was
avoiding litigation and . . . saving time and expense" and the mutual signing of
this agreement or a duplicate of this agreement." Instant case at 344.
2. The court in overruling plaintiff's faint contention to the contrary as to the inter-
pretation of The Grain Futures Act, 42 STAT. g8 (922), 7 U. S. C. A. § 6 (I927), quoted
Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U. S. 188, 198 (1933).
3. TEX. PEN. CODE (1925) §§ 658, 661.
4. Armstrong v. Toler, ii Wheat. 258 (U. S. 1826) ; Nye v. Chase Nat. Bank, 34 F.
(2d) 435 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) ; De Leon v. Trevino, 49 Tex. 88 (1878) ; 3 WILISTON, CoN-
TRACTS (1922) § 1752.
5. Singleton v. Benton, 114 Ga. 548, 40 S. E. 811, 58 L. R. A. I81 (I9o2) ; Hall v.
Kimmer, 61 Mich. 269, 28 N. W. 96 (1886); Fain v. Headerick, 44 Tenn. 327 (x867);
Aubert v. Maze, 2 Bos. & P. 371 (C. P. 18o).
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verged into conflict. But when they have, the latter, more fundamental, has
generally been supported.6 The instant case nevertheless reached the opposite
result in summary fashion. Much emphasis was placed by the court on the
recognized test of the enforceability of a demand connected with an illegal trans-
action: whether plaintiff can establish his case without the aid of the illegal
matter.8 "Freedom of contract" disciples and traders in commodity futures 9
might hail this. However, the label "incidental to the illegal speculation" placed
by the court on the arbitration contract cannot explain away the fact that the
result is bad in both legal theory and practice. In the instant case, suit was
on the arbitration award. Therefore, what is a fit subject for arbitration must
be considered before the validity of any award growing out of the proceedings
can actually be determined. Yet the court hardly considered the obvious fact
that the arbitration contract was formed expressly to settle differences arising
directly from illegal dealings. 10  If, in similar situations, the "incidental connec-
tion" rule should continue to be supported by courts, it would seem practically
that a prospect of the settlement of disputes over illegal matters by courts of law
might readily be foreseen. Therefore, steady refusal to allow unlawful matters
to be fit subjects for arbitration seems preferable to the otherwise likely paradox
of having courts of law actively participate in the settling of illegal transactions.
Hence, the desired solution is adherence to basic common-law principles concern-
ing fit subjects for arbitration first,1 the "incidental taint of illegality" 12 rule
in contracts afterwards.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AGRICULTURAL ADJUST-
MENT ACT AS A REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERcE-FIXING OF MILK
PRICES FOR CHICAGO SALES AREA-Defendants were engaged in purchasing
milk from producers in Wisconsin and Illinois, then selling and distributing the
6. Singleton v. Benton, 114 Ga. 548, 40 S. E. 811, 58 L. R. A. 18i (1902) ; cf. Tandy
v. Elmore-Cooper Live Stock, 113 Mo. App. 4o0, 87 S. W. 614 (905) (note for the
amount of an arbitration award arising out of an illegal transaction held to be tainted by
the original illegality); Polk v. Cleveland Ry., 20 Ohio App. 3r7, i51 N. E. 808 (i925).
Contra: Davis v. Wentworth, 17 N. H. 567 (1845), for an adverse criticism of which see
Note (1903) 58 L. R. A. t82; cf. Goodwin v. Yarbrough, I Stew. 152 (Ala. 1827); Noble
v. Peebles, 13 S. & R. 319 (Pa. 1825).
7. Thomas v. Little, 209 Ala. go, 96 So. 896 (1923) ; Taylor v. Chester, L. R. 4 Q. B.
3o9 (i869); RESTATE-MENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 597; see Tomkins v. Seattle Construc-
tion & Dry Dock Co., 96 Wash. 5II, 513, i65 Pac. 384, 385 (1917).
8. Plaintiff in the principal case could do this easily, since primca facie a valid written
contract existed to abide by the arbitration award. Supra note I.
9. Taylor, Trading In Commodity Futures-A New Standard Of Legality (1933) 43
YALE L. J. 63, at 92. "The erratic and hostile attitude of the courts toward the exchanges
has simply tended to lower the moral sense of the community by encouraging 'welching'.
It is all very well for the courts to refuse to enforce frank 'bets', but to decline legal sanc-
tion to an enormous section of business practice, much of which is carried on with serious
and justifiable motives, is to undermine respect for business obligations and endanger
commercial honesty."
io. And yet it is settled that illegal transactions are not a fit subject for arbitration.
Pittsburgh Const. Co. v. West Side Belt R. R., i5i Fed. 125 (W. D. Pa. I9o7); Smith,
Coney & Barrett v. Becker, Gray & Co. (i9i6) 2 Ch. 86; 6 LAWSON, RIGHTS, REMEDIES
AND PRACTICES (I890) § 3306.
ii. Supra note io.
12. Mr. Justice Holmes, in Graves v. Johnson, 179 Ivlass. 53, at 58, 6o N. E. 383 (1901),
observed, in fixing the degree of proximity to the illegal transaction necessary to taint a
new contract, that the moral turpitude involved in the original transaction will be given
some weight by the court. "The line of proximity will vary somewhat according to the
gravity of the evil apprehended." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (932) § 597, Comments a
and b, recognize this.
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same to consumers in the Chicago Sales Area.' Defendants violated the pro-
vision of the Chicago Milk License, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture under
authority vested in him by the Agricultural Adjustment Act,2 which fixed the
minimum prices 3 to be paid by distributor to producer.4 The Secretary sought
to enjoin defendants from continuing in business, after their licenses were
revoked. Held, that a temporary injunction be granted, the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act being constitutional and the licenses issued pursuant thereto valid as
a regulation of interstate commerce. United States v. Shissler, 7 F. Supp. 123
(N. D. Ill. April 1934). Contra: Edgewater Dairy Co. v. Wallace, 7 F. Supp.
121 (N. D. Ill. June I9 34 ).'
The decisions dealing with the interpretation of Congress' power to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce show considerable diversities, and, on the
whole, do not lead to any definite conclusions as to the scope of this power.
There are many and seemingly contradictory cases both for and against a decision
favoring the powers purported to be granted under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act.7 They may, however, be divided generally into two groups enunciating
for different purposes contrary theories of interpretation. The stricter view is
that there is a definite and real distinction between production or manufacture
and commerce." The court in the Edgewater case adopted this view, and de-
clined to support the price-fixing measures solely on the ground that they were
an attempt to regulate the "production" of milk through the milk distributors.9
Other cases uphold a broad, inclusive authority of Congress under the commerce
i. Under the License, this comprises the city of Chicago and all that territory within
thirty-five miles of the corporate limits of the city of Chicago. License for Milk-Chicago
Milk Shed. U. S. L. WFax, A. A. A. Agreements and Licenses, at 4-001.
2. 48 STAT. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 6oi-6o9 (Supp. 1933). Section 8 (3) of the Act
gives to the Secretary of Agriculture authority to issue licenses "permitting processors,
associations of producers, and others to engage in the handling, in the current of interstate or
foreign commerce, of any agricultural commodity or product thereof."
3. License for Milk-Chicago Milk Shed, Exhibit A, U. S. L. WEEK, A. A. A. Agree-
ments and Licenses, at 4-003.
4. Section III of the License provides: "Now, therefore, the Secretary of Agriculture
. . . hereby licenses each and every distributor of fluid milk for consumption in the Chi-
cago metropolitan area to engage in the handling in the current of interstate or foreign
commerce of said fluid milk," etc. U. S. L. Week, A. A. A. Agreements and Licenses, at 4-002.
5. In treating the two cases as contra, there is this caveat to be considered. The
facts of the Edgewater Dairy Co. case do not in express terms indicate that the parties
plaintiff are distributors of milk. The text of the opinion, however, strongly impresses
one that this is the fact, and it is submitted that this is the only reasonable inference,
especially in view of the fact that it is the distributors who are licensed under the License
for Milk.
6. For example, one who mines company coal to be used in hauling interstate freight is
not engaged (or employed) in interstate commerce, Delaware, L. & W. R. R. v. Yukonis, 238
U. S. 439 (915) ; but an employee of an interstate railroad company who cooks food which
is fed to workmen who are employed in repairing a bridge on an interstate railroad is en-
gaged (or employed) in interstate commerce, Philadelphia, B. & W. R. R. v. Smith, 250 U. S.
IOI (191o). The solicitation of insurance is not interstate commerce, Paul v. Virginia, 8
Wall. x68 (U. S. 1869) ; but the solicitation of advertising is, Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill
Posters, 260 U. S. 50, (1923) ; as is also the solicitation of freight and passenger business.
McCall v. People, 136 U. S. 1O4 (189o).
7. ". • . Anybody may cite cases seeming to prove the particular contention of the
orator, with reference to congressional powers over state activity. It is evident that a mere
citation of precedents will lead to no conclusion, other than that the cases indicate more and
more about less and less." Feuerlicht, The Interstate Commerce Clause and the N. R. A.
(1934) 9 IND. L J. 434, 439.
8. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 (1888) ; Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228
U. S. 665 (1913) ; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
9. See 7 F. Supp. 121 (N. D. Ill. 1934) 122-123.
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clause. 10  The Shissler case adopted this more liberal attitude. An explanation
of the anomaly of the same court adopting, within a period of less than three
months, each of these contradictory views is not discernible from the decisions,
the later failing to mention the earlier. Nor did any insurmountable legal ob-
stacle compel the conclusion reached in the Edgewater case. The Supreme Court
has never so defined "regulation of interstate commerce" as to exclude the factual
set-up of this case from its definition. The interpretations of this clause have
been stated in vague and general terms,"' so that the bases of the decisions have
been almost wholly factual. The court, in the Edgewater case, might easily have
fitted the facts of that case into these prior definitions. The decision in the
Shissler case seems preferable. Business today is transacted on a national scale,
and the development of the facilities for transportation and communication has
increased the volume of interstate activity. The price, then, at which an article
sells in one state will directly affect the price of the same article in neighboring
states, and thereby affect the interstate commerce in that article. Furthermore,
an economic depression causes local conditions to affect more directly interstate
commerce than under normal circumstances, since industry in one area becomes
far more sensitive to standards elsewhere.12 There seems, then, to be not only
legal justification for the Shissler decision, but social and economic sanction as
well.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CONTROL OVER CURRENCY-POWER OF CONGRESS
TO NULLIFY GOLD CLAUsEs-Plaintiffs sought judgment on bonds obligating
defendants to pay in gold coin of the standard of weight and fineness existing
when the debt was incurred. Joint Resolution of Congress, June 5, 1933, de-
clared such clauses void and all obligations containing them dischargeable in
any current legal tender, dollar for dollar.' Held, that the Resolution was con-
stitutional as an exercise of Congress' power over currency. In the Matter of
the Missouri Pacific Railroad, U. S. L. WEEK, June 26, 1934, at 945 (E. D. Mo.
1934) ; Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 265 N. Y. 37, 191 N. E. 726
(934).2
The thesis of the courts' argument may be stated in two propositions: (I)
The Constitution reposes in Congress the power to determine the nature and
composition of the circulating medium; (2) Since this Joint Resolution is merely
an effort to effect a change in the circulating medium, it is authorized by the
Constitution. In cases related to the first proposition it has been held that
Congress has power to eliminate state bank notes from circulation in order to
exclude the use of all currencies but its own,3 to declare something besides gold
and silver legal tender,' and to exercise the money power and the power of
eminent domain to prohibit gold hoarding.5 When considered in the aggregate,
io. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I (U. S. 1824) ; Hippolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220
U. S. 45 (1i9i); Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp, 7 F. Supp. (N. D. Ga. 1934).
ii. The courts speak in terms of such formulae as "fostering and protecting interstate
commerce", "in the current of interstate commerce", "burdens on interstate commerce",
"effect on interstate commerce", and "public interest".
12. See Note (1933) 47 HARV. L. REv. 85, 89.
I. 48 STAT. 112, 31 U. S. C. A. § 463 (1933).
2. Cert. granted, U. S. L. W=aK, Oct. 9, 1934, at IO, #270.
3. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869).
4. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1870) [overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 8
Wall. 603 (U. S. 1869)] ; Juillard v. Greenman, no U. S. 421 (1884).
5. Campbell v. Chase National Bank of City of New York, 5 F. Supp. I56 (S. D. N. Y.
1933) ; cf. Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U. S. 302 (1910) (holding that the power to
coin money involves the power to prohibit its export). See Thayer, Legal Tender (1887)
i HARV. L. REV. 73, 83-85.
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these precedents in the federal courts favor such a broad interpretation of the
money and borrowing powers that the first proposition may be accepted as a
correct statement of the law. In order to test the second proposition, it is neces-
sary to apply the McCulloch v. Maryland doctrine that the means used must be
plainly calculated to attain the authorized end.6 As the enactment of the Reso-
lution may be considered an effort of the government to insure the use of, its
currency 7 as the basic unit of exchange, this time-honored requirement is prop-
erly satisfied." It is then unimportant whether the parties bargained for gold
as a commodity or merely stated a money obligation, 9 since the number of gold
clause obligations is so great that their literal enforcement would involve the use
of gold as a standard of exchange and hence bring them within the currency
power.10 The fact that there was no substantial variation from the amount of
purchasing power intended to be secured, but rather a re-adjustment of the literal
terms of the obligations to economic conditions, serves to quiet the misgivings
which might otherwise have attended the present result."1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAxATIoN-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
IMPOSING TAx ON NET PROCEEDS OF FOREIGN FIRE INSURANCE COMPANIES
WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AS TO SOURCE OF PRocEF/s-State of Illinois sued
appellant fire insurance company, incorporated in Wisconsin and licensed to do
business in Illinois, for tax on net receipts from casualty insurance. The taxing
statute I governed fire, marine, and inland navigation insurance companies and
6. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
7. On May 12, 1933, Congress empowered the President to issue three billion dollars in
United States notes and to decrease the gold content of the dollar. The notes were to be
legal tender for the payment of all debts. 48 STAT. 51, 31 U. S. C. A. § 82 (1933).
8. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869).
9. The recent House of Lords decision, In re Soci&6 Intercommurale Belge d'Electricit6,
Feist v. Soci&6, [1934] A. C. 161, interpreted a gold clause as stating the true value of the
obligation. See (934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 533. Decisions in the American state jurisdictions
treating the contract on the commodity theory and enforcing the gold clause are: Myer and
Wormer v. Kohn and Dauterman, 29 Cal. 278 (1865) ; Myers and Marcus v. Kaufman, 37 Ga.
6oo (1868) ; Dutton v. Pailaret, 52 Pa. iog (1866). Earlier Supreme Court decisions up-
holding the gold clause employed both the commodity and "dual currency" theories. Bronson
v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229 (U. S. 1868) ; Butler v. Horwitz, 7 Wall. 258 (U. S. 1868) ; Gregory v.
Morris, 96 U. S. 619 (1877). Gradually the commodity theory received less emphasis. Dewing
v. Sears, II Wall. 379 (U. S. 187o) ; Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687 (U. S. 1871) (where
the clause ran "payable in specie") ; Thompson v. Butler, 95 U. S. 694 (1877). Among the
state cases refusing to enforce the gold clause were: Dewing v. Sears, 14 Allen 413 (Mass.
x867) ; Rodes v. Bronson, 34 N. Y. 649 (1866) ; Irving Trust Co. v. Hazlewood, 148 Misc.
456, 265 N. Y. Supp. 57 (933) ; Shollenburger v. Brinton, 52 Pa. 9 (1866). See generally
Nebolsine, The Gold Clause in Private Contracts (1933) 42 YA.LE L. J. lo5i; Payne, The
Gold Clause in Corporate Mortgages (1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 370; Collier, Gold Contracts and
Legislative Power (934) 2 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 3o3; Note (933) I GEo. WASH. L. REV.
493. io. It is generally said that nearly all corporate and public bonds in addition to numerous
personal obligations contain the gold clause. See BUSINESS WEEK, June 7, 1933, at 7; Payne,
The Gold Clause in Corporate Mortgages (1934) 2o A. B. A. J. 37o. The District Court in
the first cited principal case remarked that the gold clause obligations had been estimated as
amounting to ninety billion dollars at the minimum.
ii. Index of commodity prices from 1926 to the date of the Resolution's passage in-
cludes the following figures: (Base Year 1913 = ioo) Nov., 1926, 149.5; June, 1927, 141;
June, 1928, 151; June, 1929, 148; June, 1930, 129; May, 1931, 103; May, 1932, 88; May, 1933,
9o.5. Significant is the fact that the index for May, 1933, on a gold basis was 77. 41 ANNA-
LIST 763 (1933) ; 136 COMIERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 3801 (1933).
I. ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) C. 73, § 159.
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provided that all foreign insurance companies should be taxed on the basis of
their net local receipts, without specifically mentioning that the tax applied to the
casualty insurance receipts of these companies. Held (Cardozo, Brandeis, and
Stone, JJ., dissenting), that the statute as construed by the state court in allowing
state recovery 2 discriminated against and deprived appellant of the equal protec-
tion of the laws under the Constitution, because foreign casualty companies paid
no tax whatsoever on their net receipts.
3 Concordia Fire Insurance Co. v. People,
54 Sup. Ct. 830 (1934).
The equal protection clause of the Constitution abrogates the state taxing
power when the state classifies the subjects of taxation "unreasonably" or "arbi-
trarily". 4 Within proper classifications the tax must bear equally.
5  The pro-
priety of reasonable classification is maintained though the state discriminates,
for the purpose of taxation, between domestic and foreign corporations,
6 between
domestic and foreign insurance companies,
7 or between foreign corporations
themselves.8 Nor is the power of classification limited by the mere fact that the
subjects of taxation competeY In the principal case, the effect of the dissent
and of the state court decision would be to establish a distinction between the
casualty insurance business done by foreign fire insurance companies, and that
done by foreign casualty insurance companies. In the light of the "Chain Store
Cases",10 where it was held that a higher tax per store on chain stores than on
individual stores was not discriminatory, and the "Laundry Case"," where the
Court held that a tax on hand laundries as distinguished from steam laundries
and laundries operated by women was not discriminatory, this would seem to
be a "reasonable" classification. 12  But in these last-mentioned cases, the obser-
vation is inescapable that by sustaining the distinctions made by the states, the
Supreme Court gave hesitant approval to the social or economic result desired
by the various legislatures. 3  No such extra-legal justification for the classifica-
tion appears here-no practical purpose is served by penalizing fire
companies for the casualty insurance business they do, especially since
2. People v. Concordia Fire Insurance Co., 350 IIl. 365, 183 N. E. 241 (1932) [where the
court apparently relied on an unsupported dictum of Taft, C. J., in Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v.
Harding, 272 U. S. 494, 5o6 (1926)].
3. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Board of Review of Cook County, 264 IL. II, 105 N. E.
704 (1914) (net receipts of foreign casualty companies not subject to taxation by this 
statute
or any other statute).
4. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412 (1912); Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders,
274 U. S. 490 (1927) ; Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32 (1928) ; BLACK,
CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW (1927) § 228.
5. BLAcx, op. cit. supra note 4, at §§ 228, 229. But see CooLEY, CoNsTiTunONAL LIm-
ITATiONS (7th ed., 1903) 738.
6. Fire Ass'n of Phila. v. New York, iig U. S. io (1886); Pembina Consol. Silver
Min. & Mill. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181 (1888) ; Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts,
231 U. S. 68 (1913).
7. Liverpool & L. Life & Fire Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, Io Wall. 
566 (U. S. 187o);
Ducat v. Chicago, io Wall. 410 (U. S. 1870).
8. Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147 (1918) ; Northwestern Mutual 
Life
Insurance Co. v. State of Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132 (1918).
q. State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931);
Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912).
io. Board - Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931) ; Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933), (933)
81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 871.
1i. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (912).
12. For cases invoking the doctrine of "reasonableness" in discrimination, 
cf. Quaker
City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389 (1928), (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 
12o; Puget
Sound Power & Light Co. v. City of Seattle, 291 U. S. 619 (1934), (934) 
82 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 865; and cases cited in Note (1931) 73 A. L. R. 1464.
13. See Howard, The Supreme Court and State Action 'Challenged 
Under the Fourteentk
Amendment, 1931-1932 (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 505.
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these receipts are easily distinguishable and represent a considerable portion of
the fire companies' revenue. 14  The majority holding in the principal case indi-
cates that the Court will rely less on stare decisis than on a pragmatic evalua-
tion of "reasonableness" in taxation-discrimination cases.'9
CORPORATIONS-DIVIDENDS-RIGHT OF PREFERRED SHAREHOLDERS TO
PARTICIPATE IN SURPLUS BEYOND STATED PREFERENCE-Articles of incorpo-
ration, by-laws and stock certificates gave preferred stock preferences in divi-
dends and in assets, without limitation in either respect, except that the stock
certificates allowed the preferred dividend "and no more". ' Preferred divi-
dends were paid regularly, including 1929, when larger cash dividends were
received by the common stock, and a dividend of common stock was distributed
equally among outstanding common and preferred shares. Then cash dividends
were distributed on all common stock. Held, that the entire stock dividend was
invalid, since it resulted in giving preferred shareholders a dividend participation
beyond their stated preference.' Tennant v. Epstein, 189 N. E. 864 (Ill. 1934).
On the problem of allowing further distribution of surplus to preferred
shareholders either by way of participation in dividends or of taking shares
issued below market value,3 the courts are not in full accord. Although granting
that the statutes and corporate instruments 4 determine whether preferred shares
may participate, most texts state,5 and the Pennsylvania rule is,6 that preferred
shares are participating unless expressly limited. Most courts, however, realizing
the variety among preferred shares,7 have searched the corporate instruments for
denial or grant of the right. If the instruments neither prohibit 8 nor provide
for 9 participation, these courts have examined the parties' words and actions as
14. Principal case at 838, in which the analogy to a department store is not well taken-
it being certainly less difficult to determine "constituent" casualty receipts than to segregate
receipts from individual articles sold in a department store; and 139 is something more than
a "small segment" of fire companies' receipts.
x5. This decision leaves open the problem whether the statute might not have been con-
stitutional had the receipts of foreign casualty insurance companies been taxed on some equiva-
lent though not identical basis. See (1928) 8 B. U. L. Rrv. 290.
x. The articles of incorporation provided the preferred stock "shall be a first lien on the
assets of the company, in event of its dissolution, over the common stock of the company, and
shall be entitled to payment of 7% cumulative dividend annually before any dividend shall be
declared and paid upon the common stock."
2. The court declared it invalid as to the common shares also, apparently in order to
avoid distorting voting strength.
3. The problem of the right of preferred shareholders to any surplus above the stated
preference is common to both these situations. See Russell v. Am. Gas and Electric Co., 152
App. Div. 136, 138, 136 N. Y. Supp. 6o2, 604 (1912). In some situations, however, there is
a distinction between cash and share dividends which is discussed farther on in the text.
4. "Corporate instruments" is here used to designate the articles, by-laws and stock cer-
tificates.
5. 1 COOK, COi'ORATx0Ns (8th ed., 1923) §269; 2 PURD's BFcH, PRIVATE CoRPoRA-
TIONS (905) § 471; Note (193o) 67 A. L. R. 765, 774.
6. Englander v. Osborne, 261 Pa. 366, io4 Atl. 614 (ii8), Note (i92o) 6 A. L. R. 8oo.
7. See Scott v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 93 Md. 475, 497, 49 AtI. 327 (190) ; (1931) 8o
U. OF PA. L. REv. .466, at 467.
8. Scott v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 93 Md. 475, 49 Atl.. 327 (19O1) (preferred dividend
"not exceeding" 4%) ; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Union Pac. R. R., 212 N. Y. 36o, lo6
N. E. 92 (1914) ("no other or further share of the profits") ; Lyman v. Southern Ry., 149
Va. :274, 141 S. E. 240 (1928) (after paying preferred dividends directors might pay divi-
dends "upon any other stock").
9. Bailey v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 17 Wall. 96 (U. S. 1873) ; Gordon's Fx'rs v. Rich-
mond, F. & P. R. R., 78 Va. 501 (1884).
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interpreting the "contract", 10 or have denied participation either by implying a
limitation to the stated preference", or by following the prevalent understanding
of the investing public.12 To protect the preferred shareholders' proportional
interests in assets, some courts have allowed participation in stock dividends to
preferred shares not limited as to asset distribution; 1" but this reason does not
apply to a cash dividend, nor to a situation in which the preferred shares are
limited as to capital, for here participation in a dividend of common stock in-
creases the preferred shareholders' proportional interests in the assets. One case
has allowed preferred shares with voting rights to participate in a stock dividend
to maintain proportional voting strength." It is submitted that the courts' goal
should be the preservation of those interests which investors in given cases were
led reasonably to believe they acquired, 15 e. g., a right to participate and a certain
proportional voting strength and interest in assets. 6 In the instant case the
court declared invalid the whole stock dividend, because it enabled the preferred
shareholders to share in the subsequent cash dividend (declared on common
stock), as to which the court held the preferred shares were limited-a conclu-
sion drawn unwarrantedly from the existence of a preference, but justifiably
from the circumstances and the parties' words and actions. 17
COURTS-FEDERAL JURISDICTION-POWER OF A FEDERAL COURT TO ENJOIN
PROCEEDINGS IN A STATE COURT WHICH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE B;AINKRUPTCY
AS A DISCHARGE OF CERTAIN CLAIMS-Debtor executed an assignment of
future wages. Subsequently he was adjudicated a bankrupt and duly discharged.
Assignee sued the employer for wages earned subsequent to bankruptcy, where-
upon assignor petitioned federal court to enjoin assignee from further proceed-
ing in the state court. Held, that the injunction would lie. Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 54 Sup. Ct. 695 (1934).
IO. Shimmon v. National Screw & Tack Co., 18 Ohio N. P. N. S. 569 (1916). The
words "and no more" in the stock certificates, and past acceptance of only the preferred divi-
dend although the common shares received a larger percentage, were said in the instant case,
at p. 869, to show the parties' interpretation of their rights. See Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg.
Co., 2o2 Fed. 141, 142 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913). But see dissent in Niles Case, supra, at 144.
ii. Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co., 2o2 Fed. 141 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913); Will v. United
Lankat Plantations Co., [1912] 2 Ch. 571, aff'd, [1914] A. C. ii. But see Lyman v. Southern
Ry., 149 Va. 274, 291, 141 S. E. 240, 245 (1928) (failure to provide must be interpreted dif-
ferently in different cases) ; Scott v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 93 Md. 475, 501, 49 At. 327,
329 (19O1).
12. See Stone v. United States Envelope Co., 11 Me. 394, 398, 11 Ati. 536, 538 (1920);
Thomas F. Powers Foundry Co. v. Miller, 171 Atl. 842, 848 (Md. 1934).
13. Jones v. Concord & M. R. R., 67 N. H. 234, 3o Atl. 614 (1892) ;, Thomas Branch &
Co. v. Riverside and D. River Cotton Mills, Inc., 139 Va. 291, 123 S. E. 542 (1924). As to
when a preference in assets exists, see Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 466, at 470 et seq.
A limited dividend preference may give a limited priority at dissolution in earned surplus,
even though there is no right to priority in assets. (0933) 81 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 875.
14. Riverside and D. River Cotton Mills v. Thomas Branch & Co., 147 Va. 509, 137 S. E.
620 (1927).
15. For different suggestions see Note (931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 466, at 473; Christ,
Right of Holders of Preferred Stock to Participate in the Distribution of Profits (1929) 27
MicR. L. Rxv. 731, at 745, where the problem arising when voting strength and assets inter-
ests clash is discussed.
16. The last two interests involve pre-emptive rights [see RnSTATRmENT, BusiNEss
AsSOCIATIONS (Tent. Draft, 1928) § 12, illustration 4, and § i9], and may be prohibited by
statute unless set forth in the articles. See PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp., 1933) tit. 15,
§ 2852-611; IL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1931) c. 32, § 6, par. 4.
17. All the shares of the corporation had always been held by the parties in this case, and
the court set forth at length the facts surrounding the creation of the share structure, in addi-
tion to those facts mentioned in note io, supra.
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With few legislative exceptionsi the federal courts are denied by statute 2
the power to enjoin proceedings in state courts.8 The law is well settled, how-
ever, that a federal court may restrain proceedings in a state court which would
have the effect of defeating or impairing its decrees or judgments.
4  If pro-
ceedings in a state court which had previously decided , that an assignment of
future wages survives bankruptcy tend to defeat the federal court's decrees. of
adjudication of and discharge in bankruptcy then the decision in the principal
case follows inevitably. The whole issue turns upon the question of which
court has jurisdiction in determining the effect of bankruptcy on claims pre-
sented against the debtor. It has been argued that the right to a discharge and
the effect of a discharge are wholly distinct propositions and that the proper
time and place for the determination of the effect of a discharge is when it is
pleaded or relied upon by the debtor as a defense.' The decisions expressing
this view qualify it by stating that if the state court fails to accord the proper
effect to the discharge the debtor may appeal by writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States.7  The highest federal court is therefore the court
of last resort in determining the effect of discharge in bankruptcy. A federal
court 8 has already granted an injunction where there was no conflict between
the state court's interpretation and that of the federal judiciary on the ground
that the debtor is entitled to relief from an harassing action by the creditor after
bankruptcy.9 A fortiori, an injunction would lie where the state court refused
to recognize bankruptcy as a discharge of such a claim.' 0 On logical consider-
i. The legislative exceptions to the prohibitory statute consist of: (I) proceedings in
bankruptcy (administering assets of the bankrupt's estate), 36 STAT. i1162 28 U. S. C. A.
§37g (1928) ; see also II U. S. C. A. § II, n. 194 (1928) ; (2) The Federal Insurance
Interpleader Act, 44 STAT. 416 (1926), 28 U. S. C. A. Su'P. VI §4I, n. 26 (1932); (3)
The Act To Limit The Liability of Shipowners, 9 STAT. 636 (I85i), 46 U. S. C. A. § 185
(1928).
2. 36 STAT. ii652 28 U. S. C. A. §379 (928).
3. In addition to the legislative exceptions enumerated in note I supra, the courts have
permitted exceptions to the statute in three general classes of cases: (I) Cases enjoining
the execution of fraudulent judgments. See cases collected in I BATs, FEDEAnL EQurr
PaocEnuan (ipoI) § 543; (2) Cases before administrative tribunals, such as railroad com-
missions, which have mixed legislative, executive, and judicial functions. Bacon v. Rut-
land R. R., 232 U. S. 134 (914) ; (3) Cases where the federal court must act to protect
its own jurisdiction, judgments, or decrees. See cases collected in I BATEs, FEDERA.
Egurry PRocmuRE (I90i) § 541, and see I JoYcE, IN uNcrIO s (I9o9) § 88.
4. Julian v. Central Trust Co., i93 U. S. 93 (i94); Brunn v. Mann, 151 Fed. i45
(C. C. A. 8th, i9o6); Loy v. Alston, 172 Fed. 9o (C. C. A. 8th, 19o9).
5. Mallin v. Wenham, 209 Ill. 252, 70 N. E. 564 (9o4); Monarch Discount Co. v.
Chesapeake & 0. R. R., 285 Ill. 233, i2o N. E. 743 (i918).
6. In. re Marshall Paper Co., io= Fed. 872 (C. C. A. Ist, i9oo) ; In re Havens, 272
Fed. 975, 976 (C. C. A. 2d, I92I), where it was stated, ". . . granting a discharge is a
function of the bankruptcy court alone, the effect thereof is for any court in which it is
duly pleaded or otherwise submitted for judgment."
7. See In re Havens, 272 Fed. 975, 976 (C. C. A. 2d, i921).
a Seaboard Small Loan Corp. v. Ottinger, 5o Fed. (2d) 856 (C. C. A. 4th, i93I).
9. The Court sustained its equity jurisdiction by stating that the bankrupt did not
have ati adequate remedy at law by pleading the discharge in a suit brought to collect
the debt, or by suing the employer if he wrongfully withheld wages because of the trou-
ble, financial embarrassment, possible loss of employment, and expenses attendant on such
action; that an employer reasonably might prefer to discharge an employee rather than
engage in litigation with the assignee; and that the bankrupt would prefer to pay the
debt rather than risk his employment by suing his employer for withholding his wages.
Principal case at 859.
io. The Court was all the more inclined to grant the injunction, since to refuse it
would result in sending the assignee back to the state courts where he was foredoomed,
leaving him as a last resort-after passing through the intermediate and appellate state
courts-an appeal to the Supreme Court: a process of litigation which no reasonable man
would be expected to pursue in an issue involving a small claim at most. Instant case,
at 698.
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ations, therefore, the decision of the Court is justified. And since it is conceded
that the federal judiciary has the last opinion on the question," the Court reached
the proper result from the standpoint of practical economy as well, in giving it
the first-and only-opinion." It is a decision attendant with far-reaching
effects; 13 a decision which is withal in accord with the spirit and purpose 14 of
the Bankruptcy Act.
CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL-RIGHT OF DEFENDANT TO HAVE CHARGE DELIV-
ERED BY JUDGE WHO PRESIDED AT THE TRIAL--Defendant was found guilty
of fraudulent conversion and similar offenses. The trial judge having become
seriously ill, the jury was charged, over defendant's objection, by a substituted
judge who had heard none of the testimony. Held (three judges dissenting),
that the substitution of judges rendered the entire proceeding nugatory. Com-
monvealth v. Claney, 173 Atl. 840 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1934).
The Pennsylvania court, passing upon this question for the first time,
adopted the prevailing view.- The principle that the same judge must remain
throughout a trial has adduced as its justification a number of theories. Among
these are interpretative definitions of the "trial by jury" pledged by federal and
state constitutions; 2 as well as an asserted analogy 3 to the well-established rule
that any substantial absence of the judge which leaves the bench empty during
a criminal trial is ground for reversal. 4  More reasonable is the argument that
a judge acquainted with the evidence only through the transcript of testimony,
without having observed the demeanor of witnesses or heard the addresses of
counsel, is unlikely to gain a thorough insight into the case.5  This contention
acquires particular significance in such jurisdictions as Pennsylvania, which
permit the judge, in his charge, to comment on the testimony and the credibility
of witnesses.6 Other courts, however, less tender toward the rights of a defend-
ant, have encumbered the general rule with a number of qualifications. Some
ii. See In re Havens, 272 Fed. 975, 976 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
12. By obtaining an injunction in the federal court the debtor need not submit to the
process of litigation indicated in note IO, supra.
13. Presumably one result of the decision in the principal case will be a tendency to
unify the law regarding the effect of bankruptcy on an assignment of future wages, since
in the few jurisdictions holding the minority view the assignor has but to apply to the
federal court for an injunction should the assignee attempt to enforce the claim.
14. To ". . relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness
and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent
upon business misfortunes." Williams v. 'United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U. S. 549,
554 (1915).
I. Freeman v. United States, 227 Fed. 732 (C. C. A. 2d, Io15) ; Durden v. People, 192
Ill. 493, 61 N. E. 317 (19Ol) ; People v. McPherson, 74 Hun 336, 26 N. Y. Supp. 236 (Sup.
Ct. 1893) ; Mason v. State, 26 Ohio C. C. R. 535 (904).
2. See Freeman v. United States, 227 Fed. 732, 759 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915). "It is the opin-
ion of this court that in a criminal case trial by jury means tria! by a tribunal consisting of
at least one judge and twelve jurors, all of whom must remain identical from beginning to
end."
3. See Durden v. People, 192 Ill. 493, 508, 61 N. E. 317, 320 (1901). Contra: York v.
State, 91 Ark. 582, 586, 121 S. W. 1070, 1O71 -(igog).
4. People v. Blackman, 127 Cal. 248, 59 Pac. 573 (1899) ; Thompson v. People, 144 I11.
378, 32 N. E. 968 (1893) ; Note (898) 41 L. R. A. 569; see Lehman, A Critical Survey of
Certain Phases of Trial Procedure in Criminal Cases (1915) 63 U. OF PA. L. REV. 6o9, 628-
632.
5. See Freeman v. United States, 227 Fed. 732, 759 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) ; 3 WIGMORF,
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1395; instant case at 841.
6. Burr v. Sim, 4 Whart. i5o (Pa. 1839) ; Supplee v. Timothy, 124 Pa. 375, 16 Atl. 864
(889).
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have refused to apply the rule to a mere civil trial or misdemeanor; 7 others have
invoked the defendant's consent to the substitution of judges,8 citing the familiar
maxim that the defendant will not be allowed to speculate on a favorable ver-
dict; 9 many have been readier to permit substitution after the jury has returned
its verdict, and there remains for the judge only to pass sentence, 10 to pass on a
motion for a new trial,"- or to sign a bill of exceptions.'" These liberalizations
of a specific procedural rule indicate a broader tendency on the part of appellate
courts, where they consider substantial justice to have been done, not to disturb
a verdict on rigid notions of procedural mistake."s In a few instances, a desire
to reduce the number of reversals on such grounds has manifested itself in a
refusal to presume prejudice to the defendant where none has been shown.'"
It remains to be seen, in future variants of the instant case, how far Penn-
sylvania will go in seeking to reconcile these conflicting desiderata: complete
fairness to one criminally accused, and a rapid inexpensive administration of
justice.15
DAMAGES--MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR DEATH OF A MINOR CHILD--
EFFECT OF A PENAL STATUTE REQUIRING CHILD TO SUPPORT INDrGENT PARENTS
-Plaintiff's son (aged twenty years, nine months) was killed by defend-
ant's negligence. A statute required adult children, if able, to support their indi-
gent parents where both were residents of the state, under penalty of fine and
imprisonment.' The plaintiff sought to recover compensation not only for value
7. See Turberville v. State, 56 Miss. 793, 799 (1879) ; Ellerbe v. State, 75 Miss. 522, 529,
22 So. 950, 951 (898).
8. People v. Henderson, 28 Cal. 465 (1865) ; State v. McCray, 189 Iowa 1239, 179 N. W.
627 (1920) [substitution no error where defendant (I) asks no continuance; (2) nor recall
of witnesses already examined; and (3) fully consents through counsel to continuance of the
case]; State v. Wood, 118 Kan. 58, 233 Pac. 1o29 (1925) ; cf. York v. State, 91 Ark. 582, 121
S. W. 1O7O (i9o9) which the court in the instant case at 841 attempted to distinguish on the
ground of consent. Contra: Freeman v. United States, 227 Fed. 732 (C. C. A. Zd, 1915);
Ellerbe v. State, 75 Miss. 522, 22 So. 950 (1898) ; and see instant case at 841 semble.
9. Hanye v. State, 211 Ala. 555, IoI So. lO8 (1924) ; Garre.t v. State, 21 Ga. App. 8oi,95 S. E. 3oi (1918).
io. Pegalow v. State, 20 Wis. 61 (1865). But see id. at 62-. Here (murder in the first
degree) the penalty was fixed by statute.
II. Meldrum v. United States, 151 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 9th, 19o) ; State v. Madry, 93 S.
C. 412, 76 S. E. 977 (1912) ; Notes (1907) 7 ANN. CAS. 493; ANN. CAs. I914B, 1235. The
rule has been incorporated in 31 STAT. 270 (1900), 28 U. S. C. A. § 776 (1928).
12. Bowdn v. Wilson, 21 Fla. 165 (1865) ; Ketcham v. Hill, 42 Ind. 64 (1873) ; Con-
way v. Smith Mercantile Co., 6 Wyo. 327, 44 Pac. 940; 31 STAT. 270 (1900), 28 U. S. C. A.
§ 776 (1928).
13. People v. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. 55, 130 Pac. 1O42 (913) ; People v. Fleming, 166 Cal.
357, 136 Pac. 291 (913) ; and see Durden v. People, 192 Ill. 493, 498, 6I N. E. 317, 319
(igoi) ; Baker, Reversible Error in Homicide Cases (1932) 23 J. CRIM. L. 28, 35-38. This
tendency has received legislative sanction in 4o STAT. I181 (1919) 28 U. S. C. A. § 391 (1928);
CAL. CoNsT. (1911) art. VI, §4Y2.
14. Rich v. United States, 271 Fed. 566 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) ; Armstrong v. United States,
16 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) ; and see Vernier and Selig, The Reversal of Criminal
Cases in the Svpreme 'Court of California (1928) 2 So. CALIF. L. REv. 21, 47.
15. In California over a fifty year period* (185o to 1900) more than 83% of all reversals
in criminal cases were due to "procedural errors". Vernier and Selig, supra note 13 at 26.
The trial of the instant case consumed four weeks and i,goo pages of testimony.
I. MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 27, §§ 91-93.
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of deceased's services during the balance of minority, but also, on the basis of
the statute, for loss of possible benefits conferred by it. Held (three justices
dissenting), that compensation was limited to period of minority. State, Use of
Strepay v. Cohen, 172 Atl. 274 (Md. 1934).
Actions to recover compensation for the death of another being unknown at
common law,2 the measure of damages differs widely in accordance with the
wording of the statutes.3 In an action for the death of a minor child, the weight
of authority allows recovery not only for the value of the child's services during
his minority, but also for reasonable future benefits that might accrue to the
parent after the child reaches his majority.4 As to what constitute reasonable
future benefits the courts differ.5 Because of judicial reluctance to allow juries
to speculate without evidential restrictions on the question of the child's actions
after he would have reached his majority, 6 some courts limit recovery to the
pecuniary value of the child's services during minority.7  The principal case is
an example of an attempt to extend the measure of damages in one
of the minority jurisdictions. The court held that the support statute
created no civil rights in the plaintiff of which he could avail himself in an
action against a third party. A similar interpretation of such statutes has
found support in other states.3 A second objection to the utilization of these
statutes in this manner is the constitutional one that their application would
create a different measure of damages between residents and non-residents. The
court seemed to realize the tenuous nature of this objection and did not stress itY
The principal reason for the court's unwillingness to extend the measure of.
damages is that the use of the statute does not obviate the necessity for requiring
the jury to guess blindly whether the circumstances which would make the statute
applicable would come into being, and if so, what measure of damages to apply.10
In view of this decision it seems unlikely that those minority jurisdictions which
2. Baker v. Bolton, i Campb. 493 (i8o8), decided at nisi prius, but quoted as authority
for Lord Ellenborough's proposition, "In a civil court the death of a human being cannot be
complained of as an injury." Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754 (1877).
3. For an analytical table of these statutes see TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT (2d
ed. 1913) pp. xix to lxxi.
4. 2 SEDGwic, DAMAGES (gth ed. 1912) § 575; Bond v. United Railroads of San Fran-
cisco, 159 Cal. 270, 113 Pac. 366 (I9II) ; Hayes v. Chicago R. R., 131 Wis. 399, 111 N. W.
471 (i9o7) ; Stratton v. Sioux Falls Traction System, 49 S. D. 113, 2o6 N. W. 466 (1925).
See Note (I914) 48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 687 for a collection of cases illustrating both majority
and minority views.
5. In Fisher v. Trester, iig Neb. 529, 229 N. W. 9oI (I93O), the court held that the
measure of damages was not "probable pecuniary loss" but rather pecuniary loss "which the
evidence shows with reasonable certainty". But in Luther v. Dornack, 179 Minn. 528, 530,
229 N. W. 784, 785 (I93O), the court stated that "resort must necessarily be had to probabili-
ties and even to possibilities which are reasonable". There was a similar holding in Birkett
v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., iio N. Y. 504, i8 N. E. io8 (I888).
6. Agricultural & Mechanical Association v. State, Use of Carty, 71 Md. 86, lO4, i8 Atl.
37, 38 (1889). ("But what a minor child may be able or willing to do for his father . . .
after he becomes of age, . . . is . . . a matter of conjecture too vague to enter into an
estimate of damages . .
7. 2 SEDGwicx, DA Aas (2d ed. 1912) § 575; Cappozzi v. City of Waterbury, 115 Conn.
1o7, i6o Atl. 435 (1932) ; Scherer v. Schlaberg, i8 N. D. 421, 122 N. W. iooo (i9o9) ; Powell
v. Rosseau, 38 R. I. 294, 94 Atl. 867 (1915).
8. See Haskamp v. Swenger, 85 Ind. App. 255, 258, 153 N. E. 815, 816 (1926) (penal
statute) ; Spomer v. Allied Electric Co., 12o Neb. 399, 232 N. W. 767 (193o) (remedial stat-
ute).
9. See Chief Justice Bond's dissenting opinion in principal case at 280. It would seem
that if the support statute itself which is limited in application to Maryland residents is not
unconstitutional, an indirect utilization of. it would not be.
xo. Principal case at 277.
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have either penal "I or remedial 2 support statutes will go contrary to established
precedent to complicate further an already complicated problem.'
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-PERSONS ENTITLED AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
SHARES-RIGHT OF MuRDERER's ADflNISTRATOR TO SHARE IN THE ESTATE'OF
THE VITimX-A father killed his wife and daughter and then committed suicide.
The statute of descents barred persons "finally adjudged guilty" of murder from
sharing in the estates of the victims.' The grandfather, next of kin after the
father, appealed from a decree of the orphans' court awarding the daughter's
property to the father's administrator. Held, that the decree be affirmed, since
the statutory distribution may be disturbed only by a conviction in a competent
criminal court. In re Tarla's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 Atl. 139 (1934).
Since all the judges but one 2 in the instant case agreed that the statutory
bar was inapplicable,3 the situation becomes analogous to the much-mooted one
involving a clear and unambiguous statute of descents containing no exceptions.
In Carpenter's Estate,4 which presented this exact problem, the Pennsylvania
court had previously refused to interfere with the statutory order, and the ma-
jority of courts are in accord.5 In view of the impossibility of convicting a
suicide in a competent tribunal, more comprehensive statutory prohibitions are
necessary if this phase of the problem is to be solved by legislation. Already,
however, the familiar common law maxim that one shall not profit by his own
wrong has inspired frequent attempts to reach the desired result judicially. Some
courts have held flatly that title to the estate does not pass,6 despite the majority
II. As Indiana. IND. ANN. STAT. (Baldwin, 1934) § 2893.
12. As Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 62, §§ 1012-1014.
13. Spomer v. Allied Electric Co., 12o Neb. 399, 232 N. W. 767 (930), cited note io,
supra. But see Morhart v. North Jersey Street Ry., 64 N. 3. L. 236, 238, 45 At. 812, 813
(9oo).
x. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 20, § 136.
2. Frazer, C. J., was of the opinion that the orphans' court was competent to adjudge
the father guilty of murder for the purposes of distributing the estate. But since the statu-
tory exception was admittedly made to remedy the situation in Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa.
203, 32 Atl. 637 (I895), where a conviction of murder had taken place, it is difficult to dis-
agree with the majority of the court in their contention that "finally adjudged guilty" has
reference to a criminal conviction.
3. A similar situation was presented in Hogg v. Witham, 12o Kan. 341, 242 Pac. 1o21
(1926), where a coroner's jury returned a finding that the claimant's intestate had murdered
his wife before committing suicide. This was held insufficient to bring the case under a
statute barring those "convicted of killing" from the estates of' their victims.
4. 170 Pa. 203, 32 At. 637 (1895). The statute under which this case was decided con-
tained no exceptions. See supra note 2.
5. Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. i8o, io6 N. E. 785 (1914) ; McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan.
533, 84 Pac. 112 (i9o6); Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. I, 136 Pac. 1I (1913). Insur-
ance cases in which beneficiaries are denied recovery after murdering those insured, although
sometimes cited in opposition to the majority view, are clearly not analogous, based as they
are upon contract, not statute. For a discussion of a recent case of this type, see (1932) 81
U. oF PA. L. REV. 227.
6. Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 Atl. 470 (1933) ; Garwols v. Bankers Trust Co.,
251 Mich. 420, 232 N. W. 239 (i93o), Note (ig3i) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rxv. 492; Perry v.
Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, io8 S. W. 641 (1908). An analogous situation was presented in
Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 5o6, 22 N. E. 188 (1889), an early leading case. The beneficiary
under a will murdered the testator. The court refused to heed the argument that the will
could be altered or revoked only as provided by the statute, and denied the murderer any
property on the grounds that the legislators could not have intended a result so contrary to
public policy and equity. The case is discussed in CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICAL
PROCoSS (1921) 40.
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view that there is no warrant for reading exceptions into a clearly worded stat-
ute. An ingenious means of circumventing the obstacles to this direct method
is provided by the constructive trust theory, whereby the title passes as provided
by the statute, but equity intervenes to compel the wrongdoer, or his representa-
tives, to hold the property in trust for those next in line. The theory has ample
critical support,' and has been utilized by the courts in similar situations; 8 two
dissenting judges advocated its application in the instant case.9 A difficulty is
presented by the fact that the grandfather, who probably would not have lived
to share in the estate in the normal course of events, is not in a position of being
unjustly deprived. Since, however, the administrator's rights are derived from
those of the killer, it is submitted that he has an even less persuasive claim; if
there must be a windfall, a homicide should not be allowed to dictate its recip-
ient."
TRUSTS--LIFE BENEFICIARY AND REMAINDERMAN-STATUS OF PRE-
EMPTIVE RIGHTS GRANTED DURING LIFE INTEREST-Plaintiffs were remainder-
men under a trust agreement, the corpus consisting of corporate shares. They
sought to recover, from the life beneficiary's estate, the proceeds of the sale of
pre-emptive rights granted during the life interest, contending that this sum
accrued to the trust principal and was not "income" to which decedent was
entitled by the agreement. Held, that proceeds accrued to principal only to the
extent necessary to preserve the intact value 1 of the corpus, the balance belong-
ing to income. In re Scinur's Estate, 32 P. (2d) 970 (Cal. 1934).
The disagreement as to whether pre-emptive rights granted during a life
interest 2 accrue to income or principal, in the absence of a clear expression of
intention," largely reflects the division of authority concerning the status of stock
dividends, to which these rights seem analogous.4 They accomplish, in effect,
7. Note (1917) 30 HARV. L. REv. 622; Note (1916) 64 U. OF PA. L. REV. 307; Ames,
Can a Murderer Acquire Title by His Crime and Keep It? (1897) 36 AM. L. REG. (N. S.)
225, reprinted in AMES, LEcruREs ON LEGAL HISTORY (1910) 310; 3 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1054 n. b.
8. Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. (2d) 757 (1930), (I93O) 44 HARv. L.
REv. 125; Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. I88 (927) ; Sherman v. Weber, 167
Atl. 517 (N. J. Eq. 1933), (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 183.
9. Principal case at 143.
io. Considerable critical attention has been given to the advisability of limiting the
amount of the constructive trust on the basis of mortality tables and similar data. (1933) 82
U. OF PA. L. REV. 183; Ames, supra note 7, at 237 et seq.; Note (93) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 492, 496; Note (1917) 30 HARV. L. REV. 622, 625. While this refinement seems logical
in that it makes a just award to the cestui, it does not satisfy the objection that limitation of
the trust gives the remainder to the murderer or to those claiming through him.
i. California courts define intact value as the value of the shares as it existed at the
date of the creation of the trust. In re Gartenlaub's Estate, I85 Cal. 375, 197 Pac. 9o (i9i).
2. Under the so-called "Kentucky rule," such rights and dividends belong to that
person having a present interest in them at the time of issuance or declaration, irrespective
of when the earnings they represent were accumulated. Hite's Devisees v. Hite's Execu-
tor, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778 (1892); Lightfoot v. Beard, 23o Ky. 488, 20 S. W. (2d)
go (1929). Kentucky is the only jurisdiction definitely adhering to this view which fre-
quently effects flagrant injustice.
3. An intention clearly expressed in the trust agreement governs. Gibbons v. Mahon,
136 U. S. 549 (189o).
4. Kentucky courts hold that pre-emptive rights "stand on a different footing from
the claim to a stock dividend." Hite's Devisees v. Hite's Executor, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W.
778 (1892). The argument advanced that such rights are "an incident of the original
shares" would seem equally applicable to stock dividends themselves. The conclusion that
rights are not dividends in any sense is also upheld in 2 PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929)
§ 546.
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distribution of surplus by way of a stock dividend, the shares being partly,
instead of fully, paid from surplus.- That a payment is necessary to secure the
stock does not affect the nature of the right, whidh exists primarily because of
the doctrine that shareholders are entitled to a continuance of their proportionate
interests in the corporate enterprise. Largely in order to allow each present
investor an opportunity to maintain his relative voting strength, one of the most
important interests under this doctrine, the "Massachusetts rule" arbitrarily con-
siders cash dividends as income and stock dividends as principal-a view empha-
sizing simplicity of accounting, and furnishing the trustee an accurate measure
of his duties, though minimizing the life beneficiary's equitable claims. Courts
following this practical view logically extend it, consistently classifying pre-
emptive rights as principal.7  California, however, did not see fit to follow this
course, having previously adopted the more equitable Pennsylvania rule of appor-
tionment, whereby stock dividends earned wholly or partly during the life inter-
est accrue to income, providing the intact value of the principal is preserved.
8
The instant case, of first impression in California, applied this doctrine to stock
subscription rights, recognizing an analogy that the overwhelming majority of
those jurisdictions favoring the Pennsylvania stock dividend view have ap-
parently failed to see. The practical difficulties of apportionment, the out-
standing objection to the rule, are no more insuperable in one case than in the
other. Detailed investigation of the corporate books, in order to determine that
proportion of the distributed earnings accumulated during the life interest, in-
volves no complex or unusual accounting technique, regardless of the form of
distribution. Apportionment logically should be adopted in both instances or
discarded entirely.
WORK~MEN'S COMPENSATION-RELIEF WORKERS-WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION ACTS AS APPLIED TO WOrKMEN ENGAGED IN GOVERNMENTAL UNEM-
PLOYMENT RELIEF PRoJECTs-Mandamus proceedings were instituted to deter-
mine whether governmental subdivisions engaged in Federal Emergency Relief
5. For a brief discussion of the form and nature of stock subscription rights, see
Garner and Forsythe, Stock Purchase Warrants and "Rights", (931) 4 So. CAIF. L. REv.
269. The division of authority concerning the status of stock dividends is well set forth
in 2 PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 544 et seq.; (192i) 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 288.
6. Earlier texts were prone to overemphasize the importance of this doctrine as the
reason for the existence of the right. See I Moa-v=rz, PgrvATE CoaRo0ATioNs (2d ed.
1886) § 455. That corporations continue to grant pre-emptive rights despite the legisla-
tive tendency to make issuance non-obligatory (BALLANTINE, CALTF. CoRP,. LAWS (1933
ed.) 98; CAL. CviL CoDE (Deering, 1931) § 297), indicates that perhaps the practical ad-
vantages this form of distribution offers to the companies themselves largely explain its
existence.
7. DeKoven v. Alsop, 2o5 Ill. 309, 68 N. E. 930 (i9o3); Chase v. Union National
Bank, 278 Mass. 503, 176 N. E. 5o8 (I931); Greene v. Smith, 17 R. I. 28, 19 Atl. ioSi
(1890).
8. it re Duffill's Estate, i8o Cal. 748, 183 Pac. 337 (1919) ; In re Gartenlaub's Estate,
185 Cal. 375, 197 Pac. 90 (i92i). The Pennsylvania rule has been adopted by the slight
majority of jurisdictions where the question of the status of stock dividends has squarely
arisen. Goodwin-v. McGaughy, 108 Minn. 248, 122 N. W. 6 (I9O9); Pritchett v. Nashville
Trust Co., 96 Tenn. 472, 36 S. W. 1064 (1896).
9. Lauman v. Foster, 157 Iowa 275, 135 N. W. 14 (1912) ; it re Merrill's Estate, i96
Wis. 351, 220 N. W. 215 (1928). Only three jurisdictions upholding apportionment of
stock dividends apply the doctrine to stock subscription rights: (i) Pennsylvania, Jones v.
Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 14o Atl. 862 (1928); (2) New Hampshire, Holbrook v.
Holbrook, 74 N. H. 2oi, 66 Atl. x24 (i97) ; and (3) California, in the instant case. The
RESTATENEENT, TRUSTS (Tent. Draft, 1933) § 22, indulges in the illogical view of the
majority, although the appendix indicates that the final draft may incorporate alternative
§ 228 which follows the Massachusetts view.
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projects ' were under any duty to contribute to the State Insurance Fund to
provide for workers injured while thus engaged. Held, that the governmental
subdivisions engaged in such projects need not accept the Industrial Insurance
Act 2 and contribute to the Fund, because such projects are not "state industries",
and workmen thereon are not "employees" of the state and its political sub-
divisions, which are not "employers" within the meaning of the act. State ex
rel. State Board of Charities and Public Welfare v. Nevada Industrial Commis-
sion, 34 P. (2d) 408 (Nev. 1934).
Because workmen's compensation law is entirely statutory, it is necessary
in any given case to determine whether the particular relief activity under review
falls within the scope of the state compensation act,3 and whether by the terms
of the particular act a public body can be considered an employer. It is every-
where recognized, however, that the right to workmen's compensation rests on
the contractual relation of employer and employee.4  In determining the exist-
ence of this relation, the courts have apparently, though without any conscious
reference thereto, adopted the nature and purpose of the payment made to the
worker and the method by which he is hired as the tests to be applied. As a
result three categories are discernible in the reported decisions, in the latter two
of which alone are the workmen's compensation statutes held applicable: (i)
where the extent of the relief, usually in the form of "food" or "supply" orders,
but occasionally money, is determined by investigation, and is not conditioned
upon his performing the "made work" provided for him; ' (2) where the relief
fund is administered by employing the applicant for relief on public property at
regular and specified wages for regular and specified hours; (3) where the
relief agency, acting as an employment bureau, provides work for the applicant
with some other public body, which latter employs him or not as it sees fit, and
as he fulfills its requirements.7  The principal case falls within the first cate-
gory and is consistent with decisions in other courts of the United States regard-
ing similar situations.' The English courts in finding the necessary contractual
i. Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 55, 15 U. S. C. A. § 721 (Supp. 1933).
2. NEv. CoMp. LAWS (1929) § 2680 et seq.
3. The Workmen's Compensation Acts in some jurisdictions are applied only to activities
of an extra-hazardous nature; or to those specifically enumerated in the act; or to those car-
ried on for gain.
4. McBurney v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 30 P. (2d) 414 (Cal.
1934) ; Porton v. Central (Unemployed) Body for London, 2 B. W. C. C. (N. S.) 296 (Ct.
of App. 19o8) (Each of these decisions was based on a Workmen's Compensation Act which
required a "contract of hire" or "service" as the basis for compensation). Thirty-five of the
forty-four states in the United States which have Compensation Acts, in defining employer
and employee use the term "contract of hire". The remaining nine use more general terms,
all however expressing the necessity of the existence of a regular employer-employee rela-
tionship as a prerequisite to the application of the act. Basham v. Kanawha County Court,
171 S. E. 893 (W. Va. 1934).
5. McBurney v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal., 3o P. (2d) 414 (Cal. 1934) ; Jack-
son v. North Carolina Emergency Relief Administration, 2o6 N. C. 274, 173 S. E. 58o (1934).
6. City of Waycross v. Hayes, 48 Ga. App. 317, 172 S. E. 756 (I934). It is within this
second category, that the English decisions, apparently contrary to those in this country, fall:
Porton v. Central (Unemployed) Body for London, 2 B. W. C. C. (N. s.) 296 (Ct. of App.
19o8) ; Gilroy v Mackie, 2 B. W. C. C. (N. s.) 269 (19o9).
7. McLaughlin v. Antrim County Road Comm., 266 Mich. 73, 253 N. W. 221 (934).
It is far simpler to find that the Workmen's Compensation Act applies in this category, than
in the one immediately preceding; for herein it is merely a matter of bringing the workman
into contact with an already open job, and the aspect of relief is but incidental to the employ-
ment, whereas in the preceding one the work is likely to be "made" solely for relief appli-
cants.
8. While there are no facts given in the report of the instant case, we are led to infer that
the court is dealing with a situation like that presented in the first category, not only from
the language which it employs, ". . . such workmen are not employed by the state . . .
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relationship have stressed rather the point of whether the applicant for relief
has voluntarily undertaken the employment, 9 whereas the American decisions
have given but scant consideration to this factor.10 The aspect of employment
voluntarily undertaken is present, however, in all the categories given, though the
compensation statutes are held applicable only to the latter two; it is only by
applying these categories that the apparent inconsistencies between the decisions
here and abroad can be reconciled."
but are provided with work because of the need of means of support for themselves and their
families. The money paid them is not paid as a contractual remuneration for their work, but
is paid for the relief of themselves and their families"; but also from the fact that the relief
funds being disbursed were provided by the Federal government, and other cases dealing with
funds from that source have presented situations which fall into the first category: Jackson v.
North Carolina Emergency Relief Administration, 2o6 N. C. 274, 173 S. E. 58o (1934) ; Bell
v. City of Raleigh, 2o6 N. C. 275, 173 S. E. 581 (I934).
q. Porton v. Central (Unemployed) Body for London, 2 B. W. C. C. (N. s.) 296 (Ct.
of App. 19o8) ; Gilroy v. Mackie, 2 B. W. C. C. (N. S.) 269 (19o9).
io. Cf. dissent in Vaivida v. City of Grand Rapids, 264 Mich. 204, 249 N. W. 826 (1933).
ii. But cf. (1933) 82 U. or PA. L. Rav. 185.
